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Stony Brook University 
 
For Enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. 
– Immanuel Kant1 
Introduction  
Where is it decreed that enlightenment must be free of emotion? To 
me, the opposite seems to be true. Enlightenment can properly 
fulfill its task only if it sets to work with passion.2 
This statement, which concludes the preface to the 1977 reissue of At the 
Mind’s Limits, conveys the philosophical ambition of the book: to advance 
the enlightenment project, while revising the way we understand this 
project. The idea, rejected here by Améry, that the enlightenment “must be 
free of emotion” owes most to its foremost proponent, Immanuel Kant. This 
paper picks up on this implicit allusion to Kant, and elaborates on Améry’s 
revision of the enlightenment by making the confrontation between them 
explicit.  
For Kant, enlightenment meant a turning point, individual and 
collective, from immaturity to maturity: from intellectual tutelage and 
dogmatism to intellectual autonomy and the courage to know and think for 
oneself.3 By “tutelage” Kant did not only mean political oppression or 
external control, but first and foremost the “self-imposed” passivity of those 
who, while fully endowed with rational faculties, let their reasoning be 
governed by passions and emotions, by narrow self-interest, and by force of 
habit and external decree. Enlightenment, on his view, inverts this order, 
rendering reason sovereign and turning each individual and society at large 
into the agents of their existence. 
 Améry’s emphasis on passion is not a mere reversal or rejection of this 
process of maturation, and to understand it requires to rethink what passion 
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means. The original meaning of passion, like that of passivity (both derive 
from the Latin root pati-) is being-acted-upon and being-affected-by. In other 
words, passion is having something done to you or happen to you, as 
opposed to action, which is what you make happen. I will argue that torture, 
whose analysis is the focus of the second essay of At the Mind’s Limits, is a 
paradigmatic case of passion in this original sense.4  
The subject of passion–the one acted upon–is a patient or victim. 
Kant’s critical philosophy allows no room for this modality of subjectivity, 
as it hinges on a fundamental opposition between an agent (the subject of 
practical thinking) and a spectator (the subject of theoretical thinking), and 
between transcendental subjectivity and empirical subjectivity. Passivity, in 
turn, is seen as a deficiency, a mere case of ignorance or immaturity. To 
work with passion, I will argue, requires seeing passivity as a categorically 
different modality of experience and subjectivity, and to think towards 
victimhood instead of thinking it away. 
Thinking towards victimhood is also thinking towards the limits of the 
mind (An den Grenzen des Geistes)–a dimension in which the mind is not the 
mover but moved. Thinking towards its own limits advances the critical self-
awareness of reason and is therefore vital to the enlightehment project. Yet 
this mode of thinking is precluded by Kant due to his efforts to fortify 
reason within its proper (“pure”) domain.  
This paper is divided into two main parts. The first analyzes Kant’s 
Antinomy of Pure Reason, in particular the third antinomy (of freedom), in 
which he articulates what I call his ‘dual standpoint theory’, categorically 
distinguishing between the practical and the theoretical tasks of reason and 
between the two modalities of subjectivity–the “empirical” and the 
“intelligible.” With this Kantian framework as a background, the second 
part reconstructs Améry’s work, especially in his essay on torture, as 
proposing a new or modified antinomy, which I call “the fifth antinomy,” 
and from it, a third mode of thinking that is neither theoretical nor practical. 
I call this third mode of thinking “pathological,” while distinguishing it from 
the kind of thinking that Kant labeled as such. The conclusion returns to 
address the question of what enlightenment means if it “sets to work with 
passion.” 
 
The Third Antinomy in Kant and Dual-Standpoint Theory  
a) What is an antinomy? 
The “Antinomy of Pure Reason” as Kant names it in the Critique of Pure 
Reason is a structural feature of reason that is responsible for some of the 
most pervasive metaphysical disputes in the history of philosophy. These 
disputes all revolve around “cosmological ideas,” namely, assumptions or 
claims about the world or about nature as a whole. In disputes of this sort, 
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Kant observes, one of the sides–the “thesis”–is dogmatist, and the other–the 
“antithesis”–is empiricist. The dogmatist advances absolute and a-priori 
truth-claims (e.g., that the world has a beginning in time, or is created and 
governed by God). The empiricist categorically rejects the validity of these 
claims because they are not empirically verifiable. As is the case with all 
disputes, what motivates this one is the conviction that one side must be 
wrong and the other right, which means that the philosopher must choose 
sides and be either a dogmatist or an empiricist. Kant aims to “solve” the 
antinomy by showing that there is no real choice to be made and no ground 
for dispute. 
His overarching claim is that the root of the antinomy is a duality within 
reason between two different faculties: pure Reason and the Understanding. 
The proper field of the Understanding is appearances (sensory experience), 
which it arranges in time and space according to its concepts with the help 
of the Imagination. The proper domain of Pure Reason, by contrast, is a-
priori, transcendental ideas that are essentially independent of the world of 
appearances. The semblance of a dispute between a thesis and an antithesis 
results from a failure to adequately distinguish between these faculties and 
their respective domains, and more generally speaking, from the failure to 
distinguish between appearances and things-in-themselves. Consequently, 
the faculties infringe on each other’s jurisdiction. Thus, for example, when 
we envision a “personal” God as located in some place or time, in or beyond 
the world, we are making an appearance out of a pure idea (of an 
absolute/necessary being); and when we claim that God (an 
absolute/necessary being) does not exist, because it cannot possibly appear, 
we are in effect reducing an idea to empirical presence. The ultimate task of 
a “critique” of reason is to clarify the structure of reason–both in its 
overarching unity as a complex, and in its inner division into faculties and 
jurisdictions. Such clarification allows us to prevent transgression between 
categorically different modes of thought, but also to harmonize their 
operation in the common interest of the whole, namely, self-governance.  
 
b) The third antinomy and its solution 
With his known penchant for tetralogical constructions, Kant enumerates 
four antinomies, or four manifestations of the antinomic structure. The third 
of these, “the antinomy of freedom,” is responsible for the age-old dispute 
between advocates of predetermination and advocates of free will. As Kant 
dubs it, the antithesis of this antinomy argues that there “is no freedom 
[and] everything in the world takes place in accordance with the laws of 
nature,” while the thesis insists that “there is also another causality, that of 
freedom.”5  
When dubbing the thesis of the antinomy, Kant resorts to the first-
person voice, a literary gesture more often associated with a writer like 
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Descartes, and gives the following example: “for instance, I at this moment 
arise from my chair, in complete freedom, without being necessarily 
determined thereto by the influence of natural causes.”6 But of course, the 
claim that this example demonstrates freedom is precisely what stands in 
dispute. 
To clarify the empiricist standpoint on the matter, let us name the 
physiological (chemical, neurological, muscular) processes that occur in the 
person’s body as ‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z’. The empiricist states that if x, y, and z 
happen, then the body in which they occur will necessarily get up from the 
chair. Moreover, if they do not happen, it will necessarily remain seated. 
There is, therefore, a chain of natural causes that provides sufficient 
explanation for the movement and leaves neither room nor need for 
postulating something like choice. Kant’s response in defense of the thesis is 
that the “causality of our will… independently of those natural causes, and 
even contrary to their force and influence… [can] begin a series of events 
entirely of itself.”7 Apparently, this means that the reason for which x, y, and z 
happened in the first place is the choice of free will. But the problem is 
precisely that no such “beginning” manifests itself in sensory experience. To 
answer the question of why x, y, z happened in the first place, the scientist 
will go on pointing out antecedent occurrences (u, v, w… and so back 
indefinitely).  
The solution Kant proposes for this conundrum is transcendental. 
Understood transcendentally, “beginning a new series” does not simply 
mean beginning a particular series but modifying the entire series of events. 
To borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein: with the action of the will, the world 
“waxes or wanes as a whole.”8 This means that the phrase “new series” 
refers not only to what comes after a particular action takes place but also to 
what comes before it. It is as if a free action changed at once the past, the 
present, and the future.  
The transcendental solution requires to leave the grounds of both the 
empiricist and the dogmatist mindset and concede to the opening gesture of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that time is a form of intuition 
and not a thing in itself. On this view, the “past” and its contents are not a 
pre-given, as we normally tend to assume, but are the product of a regressive 
synthesis of information. This regressive synthesis is what empirical science 
does whenever it explicates particular appearances: it begins from a given 
event and traces it back to antecedent causes. For that, it does not simply 
discover causal connections but actively establishes them. Science is therefore 
something we do in accordance with the laws of nature.  
The scientific postulate that every event must have a natural cause 
according to the law of nature is therefore not an axiom (a truth about nature 
“itself”) but a “regulative principle.” It determines how we, in our capacity 
as scientists, ought to think. This regulative principle, as Kant puts it, “is thus 
R o y  B e n - S h a i  |  2 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.785 
properly only a rule, prescribing a regress in the series of the conditions of 
given appearances, and forbidding it to bring the regress to a close by treating 
anything at which it may arrive as absolutely unconditioned.”9  
What makes such indefinite regress necessarily possible is the structure 
of human experience, in which factual and sensory data are always already, 
spontaneously, informed and arranged by the Imagination in accordance 
with the rules of the Understanding. But these rules only apply to 
appearances. The laws of nature are essentially the laws of the 
Understanding and the Imagination and they only govern and determine 
the relationship between one appearance and another, given that they 
appear. The reason for which scientific inquiry will never find evidence of 
freedom is not that it does not exist but that it does not operate in time: it is 
not an appearance but a cause underlying appearances and their synthesis. 
Because the jurisdiction of science is only the field of appearance, it is 
unqualified, and forbidden, to pass judgment on whether freedom exists or 
not. As soon as it tries to answer this question, it violates its own rule. 
The dogmatic stance is similarly overreaching insofar as it attempts to 
“point” to the occurrence of freedom within the field of appearances (“I at 
this moment arise from my chair....”). What is common to dogmatism and 
empiricism is therefore the conflation of the transcendental and the 
empirical. Both treat freedom, which is a transcendental idea, as an 
empirical phenomenon – the one denying and the other affirming it as such. 
In truth, just as natural causality is not a given fact but a rule for the 
guidance of scientific thinking, so too freedom is not a given fact but a rule 
for the orientation of practical thinking.  
Finally, the reason for which there is no concrete clash between the 
postulation of freedom and that of natural causality is that, unlike a miracle, 
whose effects would visibly violate the laws of nature, the causality of the 
will has simply nothing to do with these laws. It only determines whether and 
why certain things ought to happen, but not the way by which they appear 
and the laws that govern their appearance when they do.  
 
c) The dual standpoint theory 
If we can keep these conclusions steadily in view the self-conflict of 
reason will be entirely at an end. For not only will this critical 
solution destroy the illusion which set reason at variance with 
itself, but it will replace it by a teaching which, in correcting the 
misinterpretation that has been the sole source of the conflict, 
brings reason into agreement with itself.10 
This solution brings the essence of Kant’s “critical turn” into relief, namely, 
the claim that the manner by which we think determines in large part what 
world we see and live in. There is no real dispute between theoretical and 
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practical thinking because both are valid and necessary. They are valid, 
however, not in adequately describing the world, which would imply that the 
world is independent of our description of it, but in adequately determining a 
way of looking at, and thinking about, the world. This point is not merely 
theoretical. Arguably, there is a difference between the conduct of a person 
who believes herself to be free, and therefore accountable and responsible 
for her actions, and one who believes all her actions are determined by 
chance or law. Similarly, there is a difference between the way nature 
appears to a person who believes that everything that happens must be 
provided scientific explanation, and the way it appears to a person who 
assumes the workings of metaphysical, theological, mystical or mythological 
forces.  
Instead of a dispute between an empiricist and a dogmatist stance, we 
now have a distinction between two different intellectual registers and 
domains of reflections: science, or theoretical reasoning, and morality, or 
practical reasoning–the former is grounded in and committed to natural law, 
and the latter is grounded in and committed to the idea of freedom; the 
former works strictly in time, the latter through strictly a-priori and 
universal principles. Kant describes them alternately as different 
“standpoints” or “points of view.” This dual-standpoint theory means that 
one can at each point adopt or practice one or the other, but ought never to 
conflate the two.  
The importance of this theory for the possibility of moral reflection, 
according to Kant, is that, while it respects natural causality and the 
integrity of natural science, it also opens up an entire dimension–as it were, 
underneath the unchangeable course of time–in which nothing is necessary 
or simply “the case,” and everything is subject to judgment. The existence of 
this dimension allows, and demands of us, to raise questions such as: Why 
did this happen? Was it the right thing to do? It also makes it impossible for 
us to ever be content with the simple factual observation that some things 
happen and cannot be undone.  
The overall interest of reason, which for Kant is attaining self-
governance, includes both the theoretical interest in advancing knowledge 
of “what is, what has been, or what will be,”11 and the practical interest in the 
good–the way things ought to be. Science allows us to understand history, 
and morality allows us to judge it. Far from needing to usurp or disqualify 
each other, it is in their common interest to keep their respective domains 
separate, and alive.  
 
d) The dual nature of the human being 
[Seen in] this way, freedom and nature, in the full sense of these 
terms, can exist together, without any conflict, in the same actions, 
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according as the actions are referred to their intelligible or to their 
sensible cause.12  
Parallel to the distinction between the two standpoints, Kant draws a 
distinction between the “empirical” and “intelligible” character of a person, 
to which each of them “refers.” Taken in its theoretical context, the 
“empirical character” is a synthesis of the sensory appearances of a person in 
time and space (say, the body and its history). In the practical context, it 
refers to the synthesis of “sensuous impulses”–the manifold ways by which 
the person is conditioned to act. The “intelligible character,” on the other 
hand, is the person’s reasoning: not the synthesis of sensations but their 
synthesizing. Due to its transcendental stature, such reasoning is entirely 
“unaffected by… sensible influences, and [is] not liable to alteration [by 
them].”13 Reason is therefore categorically free, and provides an entirely 
different ground for the determination of the will. 
Freedom, Kant explains, “is the will’s [Willkür] independence of 
coercion [by] sensuous impulses.”14 
No matter how many sensuous impulses may impel me to will, 
they can never give rise to the “ought,” but only to a willing which, 
while very far from being necessary, is always conditioned; and the 
“ought” pronounced by reason confronts such willing with a limit 
and an end–nay more, forbids and authorizes it.15 
In its moral function, practical reason “frames for itself with perfect 
spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas to which it adapts the 
empirical conditions.”16 This law, the moral law, dictates that we must 
always guide our thinking and conduct according to strictly universalizable 
standards. One of the most famous, and contentful, of Kant’s formulations of 
the moral law reads: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an 
end and never simply as a means.”17  
The bleak side of this philosophy is in the realization that, while 
freedom grounds the possibility of self-governance, it also inevitably opens 
the possibility of evil. An evil person is not one who fails to enforce reason 
over sensuous impulses. Rather, she is one who willfully and methodically 
inverts this order, making it a rule to live by that reason must always act in 
the service of sensuous impulse. In such a case, reason produces an anti- 
moral law: to act in such a way that you treat humanity in yourself or in 
others always as a means and never as an end. When we encounter an evil 
person, we do not witness the capriciousness of sensuous impulses but the 
consistency and deliberation of a rational mind.  
Perhaps the most important and controversial message of Kant’s 
moral philosophy is that, when we morally judge a person (or ourselves), we 
must neither excuse nor blame them for empirical circumstances, but only 
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for the choices they make. To the extent that we consider a person rational, 
we cannot take the empirical circumstances of her lives and character as 
determining or explaining her actions, for these circumstances are subject to 
her own synsthesis. We must “regard reason as a cause that irrespective of 
all… empirical conditions could have determined, and ought to have 
determined, the agent to act otherwise.”18  
Because the causality of reason does not take place in time, but in each 
case modifies the entire series of conditions, we can always state that a 
“different intelligible character would have yielded a different empirical 
character.”19  
 
e) After Kant  
The problems incurred by Kant’s dual-standpoint and dual-character theory, 
on both the theoretical and practical levels, are multiple, and have been 
occupying both supporters and critics from the first publication of the 
Critique Pure Reason to this day. My own intention is not to judge Kant’s 
view for its problems, let alone to try and resolve them. Instead, I take his 
view as a given framework of thought, seeing as Améry is both profoundly 
influenced by it, and struggling against it. My reconstruction of Améry’s 
argument will present him as proposing a third standpoint–different both 
from that of Reason and from that of the Understanding, and corresponding 
to it, a third dimension of personhood–different both from what Kant calls 
the “empirical” and from the “intelligible” character.  I will call the third 
standpoint pathological and the third dimension passivity or victimhood. 
While this scheme deviates significantly from Kant’s thought and agenda, it 
follows his footsteps in at least one important respect: in endeavoring to 
draw a categorical distinction, and antinomic relation, between qualitatively 
different dimensions of experience, and between the different registers of 
thought that refer to them.  
 
Améry’s Fifth Antinomy and the Path of Moral Pathology 
a) A singular evil 
I will begin my analysis of Améry where my analysis of Kant ended: in his 
notion of evil. In the Preface to At the Mind’s Limits Améry writes that “there 
is nothing” 
that provides enlightenment on the eruption of evil in Germany… 
this evil really is singular and irreducible in its total inner logic and 
its accursed rationality… For this reason, all of us are still faced 
with a dark riddle… And all attempts at economic explanation, all 
the despairing one-dimensional allusions to the fact that Germany’s 
industrial capital, concerned about its privileges, financed Hitler, 
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tell the eyewitness nothing, tell him just as little as the sophisticated 
speculations about the dialectics of enlightenment.20  
Translated into Kantian terms the rejection of “attempts at economic 
explanation” is a rejection of the standpoint of the Understanding, or the 
empiricist attitude, whose regulative principle is to provide causal 
explications. Under the backing of this principle the empiricist standpoint 
would either bracket out or explain away whatever is “riddling” about 
history, for the same reason it denies free will: not because it does not exist 
but because “it is not of any use in explaining appearances.”21 
Améry’s affinity to Kant, however, extends only this far. What, 
according to him, resists the Understanding is not the intelligible character of 
the event (the rational agency behind it), the judgment of which belongs to 
the proper domain of pure practical reason, but a “dark riddle”–something 
that defies Reason just as much as it does the Understanding.  
In the effort to explain the “singular and irreducible” nature of the evil 
of the Third Reich without dispelling the dark riddle that surrounds it, 
Améry interprets it as “sadistic.” Opposing the common perception of 
sadism as a psycho-sexual disorder, he defines it as a disorder of reason. In 
his words: a “twisted [ver-rückte] view of the world.”22 The adjective verrückte 
ordinarily connotes madness,23 and this connotation is one of the main 
points Améry drives by equating Nazism to sadism. He elsewhere states 
explicitly that living in the Nazi regime resembled taking a tour through “a 
psychiatric clinic”24 without any doctors or orderlies in sight.25  
What most characterizes the twisted worldview of Nazism was its 
destructiveness. In Auschwitz, whose operation Améry regards as 
exemplary of the overall logic of the Reich, “the SS was employing a logic of 
destruction that itself operated just as consistently as the logic of life 
preservation did in the outside world.”26 And in the essay on torture, 
endorsing Bataille’s understanding of Sade’s philosophy, he notes that the 
sadist “does not care about the continued existence of the world,” but, on 
“the contrary: he wants to nullify this world.”27 This kind of wish cannot, 
however, be carried out simpliciter, since even if the sadist were able to 
“nullify this world” he would be nullifying himself therewith. This is why 
the sadistic logic epitomizes in torture. Creating enclaves of sustained 
destruction–death camps and torture chambers–the sadist approximates the 
experience of world-annihilation as much as it is humanly possible, bearing 
it through the destruction of his victims’ world.  
We saw that Kant’s understanding of evil involves a reversal of the 
moral law, whereby, for example, one sets for oneself as a principle to 
always treat humanity in oneself and in others as a means and never as an 
end. The language of “means” and “ends,” however, falls drastically short of 
capturing the singularity of sadism on Améry’s account. Unlike the case of 
slavery, which arguably consists of subordinating the other’s freedom to 
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one’s own gains, in sadistic torture–torture for torture’s sake–there is no 
ulterior motive for the sake of which the victim can be said to be “used.” 
“The Nazis,” Améry explains, 
tortured as did others, because by means of torture they wanted to 
obtain information important for national policy… They martyred 
their prisoners for definite purposes, which in each instance were 
exactly specified. Above all, however, they tortured because they 
were torturers. They placed torture in their service. But even more 
fervently they were its servants.28 
The sadist, on this view, does indeed treat the humanity of the other as an 
end, except that the end is to not to elevate but to destroy it. Nazism “hated 
the word ‘humanity’ like the pious man hates sin.”29 The act of torturing 
humans was therefore a form of pious devotion to the task, and experience, 
of dehumanization, which is very different from ignoring or misrecognizing 
their humanity. The governing logic of the regime, Améry concludes, was 
the Herrschaft des Gegenmenschen, “the rule of the antiman.”30 
I should note in this context that Améry’s understanding of 
“humanity” significantly differs from Kant’s. Whereas the essence of the 
human for Kant is spontaneity: free and rational agency, for Améry it is 
essentially a form of relation. The term he often uses for humanity is 
Mitmenschlichkeit, which literally means co-humanity, or humanity-with. The 
rule of the anti-man (Gegenmenschen), like the act of torture itself, retains the 
relational essence of humanity while perverting it from within, turning the 
with- (Mit-) to against- (Gegen-). Common interpretations of torture tend to 
downstate the fact that it is a relational, even intimate, practice par 
excellence. More often, they focus on the violation of the tortured person 
and her dignity rather than the violation of relationality, which may better 
account for the traumatic effects of such an experience (e.g., the difficulties 
of forming relations) on both parties involved.  
While any practice of torture, for Améry, is anti-human in this sense, 
what was singular about the Third Reich was it being “the only political 
system of this century up to this point that had not only practiced the rule of 
the antiman, as had other… regimes, but had expressly established it as a 
principle.”31  
In view of such a statement, we might be inclined to raise the 
question once again: does not this view of sadism fit perfectly into Kant’s 
definition of evil as a will that makes it a principle to always obey sensuous 
impulses?  
The truth of the matter is that, just like the opposition between 
“means” and “ends,” the one between “sensuous impulses” and 
“principles” is altogether unhelpful in capturing the singularity of sadistic 
evil. Améry’s account subverts both sides of this dualism. For one thing, in 
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keeping with his view of humanity as Mitmenschlichkeit, he associates 
sensuous impulses with care and attachment rather than with self-interest 
and self-preservation. But even more importantly, he does not see the 
principle of torture as obeying sensuous impulses, but on the contrary, as 
forbidding them. “The Hitler vassal,” he explains, “had to torture… in order 
to be great in bearing the suffering of others… so that Himmler would 
assure him [that] later generations would admire him for having obliterated 
his feelings of mercy.”32  
This observation is interestingly supported by more recent studies,33 
which point out that, in his lectures to his officers, Himmler routinely 
deployed a deontological vocabulary, pressing it upon his audience that in 
doing what they did (the nature of the deeds remained unspoken) they were 
carrying out their moral duty. The use of this kind of rhetoric suggests that 
Himmler’s officers were by no means enjoying their job. In fact, many, if not 
most, were severely demoralized. What Himmler asked of them was to 
sacrifice their self-interest and well-being for the higher ends of posterity 
and the common good. It is therefore not some inbred cruelty that defines 
sadism for Améry, but a defiance of natural-instinct on strictly moral 
grounds.  
Like some of Sade’s own writings, this account of sadism eerily reads 
as an immanent perversion of Kant’s logic, uncovering perhaps a deep 
emptiness at its heart. It suggests an openness, or indifference, in Kant’s 
moral philosophy to a kind of evil that it cannot see or name, because it 
insists on portraying reason as pure and inviolable.  
Among the questions looming behind this account, producing its 
darkly riddling effect, are: Who is the agent behind the rule of the antiman? 
What does this agency want? And why does she want it?  
The truth of the matter is that no agency is postulated here at all. The 
Nazis, as Améry suggestively puts it, placed themselves in the service of their 
Prinzip, not the other way around. Therefore, the concept of freedom, which 
underlies Kant’s moral philosophy and enlightenment in their entirety, is 
conspicuously absent from Améry’s text. Torture usurps freedom as the 
“transcendental idea” that grounds reflection.  
 
b) A “fifth” antinomy 
In a suggestive passage already cited, Améry states that Nazi evil “issued, so 
to speak, through spontaneous generation [Urzeugung] from a womb that 
bore it as a perversion [Widernatur].”34 The English translation of Urzeugung 
as “spontaneous generation” nicely underscores both the commonality with, 
and difference from, Kant. “Spontaneous” means stemming from its own 
unique origin and forming its own law. As we saw, Kant takes this to be 
another term for freedom, yet Améry shows us that the two are not 
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synonymous. Freedom, if you will, is a species of spontaneity. The 
perversion of reason, or evil, is another.   
Medical terminology has a name for a disease that “issues through 
spontaneous generation.” It is called an “idiopathic” condition. Merriam 
Webster defines idiopathic as: “(1) arising spontaneously or from an obscure 
or unknown cause; (2) peculiar to the individual.” Whether an idiopathic 
phenomenon exists or not is a moot point for both practitioners and 
theoreticians of medicine. But having looked at the structure of Kant’s 
antinomy, this mootness should come as no surprise. The antithesis of the 
third antinomy, which denies the existence of free will, would also deny the 
existence of an idiopathic event, and on the same grounds: neither freedom 
nor an idiopathic condition can admit of empirical verification; on the 
contrary, empirical observation could only serve to undermine them.  
If my interpretation is right, then Améry’s argument presents us with 
a modified antinomy–a “fifth” antinomy so to speak. The thesis of this 
antinomy is that there is another causality but that of nature: an idiopathic 
causality. Yet, unlike the third antinomy, this one casts both Reason and the 
Understanding, both freedom and nature, to the side of the antithesis. What 
the thesis asserts is a perversion, and violation, of reason itself. Kant’s 
transcendental solution to the antinomy applies here nonetheless: the event 
in question (the rise of Nazism in Germany) cannot be explained by recourse 
to antecedent conditions (e.g., economical) because it modifies the entire series, 
including the past, the present, and the future.35 An event that is Widernatur 
(literally, counter-natural), as Améry describes it, cannot be regarded as a 
happening in time in any ordinary sense. It is therefore futile to enter a 
dispute about whether his claims about Nazism are historically accurate. 
The postulation of a first cause–be it freedom or an idiopathic event–can 
neither refute nor be refuted by empirical findings. And, if it is not a 
dogmatic assertion, then it tells us less about what is the case and more 
about our mode of thinking.  
To my understanding, the fifth antinomy does not deny the legitimacy 
of Kant’s dual standpoint, namely, his convictions that: (1) freedom exists; 
(2) freedom and nature are mutually exclusive; and (3) practical and 
theoretical reasoning lead thinking along two categorically different paths. 
Instead, the fifth antinomy paves for us a third path of thinking that is 
neither theoretical nor practical. What is this thinking like? What “faculty” 
conducts it? And what is its point of reference? 
 
c) The turn toward the victim 
In the preface to the 1977 reissue of the book Améry writes: 
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I am as little interested in the Third Reich today as I was earlier. 
What occupies me, and what I am qualified to speak about, is the 
victims of this Reich. I don’t want to erect a monument for them, 
for to be a victim alone is not an honor. I only wanted to describe 
their condition–which is unchangeable.36  
Given how much he has to say about the Third Reich, it might surprise us to 
hear that he has “little interest” in it. Yet, clarifying this disinterest, I believe, 
is precisely the point of of his thesis about the Reich. Pathologizing Nazism, 
and in effect denying both the path of freedom and the path of nature in 
explaining it, operates like a phenomenological epochē (suspension, or 
bracketing-out). By bracketing out any reasonable, causal and agentive 
context to the torturous regime, this thesis shifts the focus of reflection to the 
experience of the victims of torture, thus opening way for what Améry calls 
“a phenomenological description of the victim-existence [Opfer-Existenz].”37  
The German phrase Wesensbeschreibung, translated here as 
“phenomenology”, literally means “essential-description.” In other words, it 
is a description of victimhood as such. In keeping with the phenomenological 
tradition, to describe victimhood as such is not to give it a dictionary 
definition, but to ask what it means to be a victim. In questions of this kind, 
the questioner must be thrown into the question–undergo the victim’s 
experience in her own person. Améry makes it clear, however, that this is 
not possible. Even he, in his capacity as author, cannot properly claim or 
occupy the victim position. By the mere fact of writing and thinking, and 
especially communicating with others, one already transcends victimhood. As 
my analysis will suggest, it belongs to the essence of the victim-existence, as 
exemplified in the experience of torture, that one is completely solitary and 
cut-off.  Nevertheless, the irony is that experiencing the impossibility of 
identification and communication already makes for an experiential 
approximation of the essence of such a state.  
Here is the place to state that, in my view, a “phenomenology of the 
victim-existence” is more adequately termed “pathology.” For Kant, 
“pathology” meant an a-moral mode of practical reasoning, one guided by 
emotion and self-interest rather than by duty. In its terminologically precise 
sense, however, pathology means a thinking or study (logos) that is 
concerned with pathos (Greek for suffering and passivity). Pathology in this 
sense, to recall Améry’s phrase, is a thinking that “sets to work with 
passion.” Once we take the experience of torture as our point of departure to 
the study of passion, we understand that it cannot be conflated with self-
interested desire. On the contrary, the subject of passion–the victim–is denied 
a self, separated from her “sensuous impulses” just as much as she is from 
her rationality and will.   
A passage in the torture essay, in which Améry describes his first 
experience of torture in uncharacteristically graphic detail, brings the loss of 
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both self and community to the fore. This experience, and the passage that 
describes it, are important because, as Améry puts it, they capture the 
moment in which “victimization” (the turn to the victim-existence) is 
“complete:” 
In the bunker there hung from the vaulted ceiling a chain that 
above went into a roll. At its bottom end it bore a heavy, broadly 
curved iron hook. I was led to the instrument. The hook gripped 
into the shackle that held my hands together behind my back. Then 
I was raised with the chain until I hung about a meter over the 
floor. In such a position, or rather, when hanging this way, with 
your hands behind your back, for a short time you can hold at a 
half-oblique through muscular force… All your life is gathered in a 
single, limited area of the body, the shoulder joints, and it does not 
react; for it exhausts itself completely in the expenditure of energy. 
But this cannot last long, even with people who have a strong 
physical constitution. As for me, I had to give up rather quickly. 
And now there was a crackling and splintering in my shoulders 
that my body has not forgotten until this hour. The balls sprang 
from their sockets. My own body weight caused luxation; I fell into 
a void and now hung by my dislocated arms, which had been torn 
high from behind and were now twisted over my head. Torture, 
from Latin torquere, to twist. What visual instruction in 
etymology!38  
While this is not, as he stresses, the worst form of torture imaginable (in 
terms of degree), it does, he believes, capture the essence of torture (in terms 
of kind), and with it, the essence of the victim-existence. Torture, as he 
reminds us, originally means “twist.” The victim’s twisted state graphically 
illustrates the “twisted [ver-rückte] view of the world” of the Nazi regime.39 
It also turns the word “torture” from a stock-in-trade term into a proper 
name; making it touch, if only proximately and briefly, the experience and 
reality it names, and the mind-numbing insanity of it.  
The “dislocation” of the arms is symbolic in at least two important 
ways: (1) as loss of agency and hold over the situation; (2) as the move out of 
location and localization; a thrust unto the limits of time and space, and with 
them, out of the possibility of sharing, depicting, objectifying, relating, and 
indeed, experiencing in the Kantian sense of the term. This dislocation is, 
therefore, like a “fall into void.”  
Falling into void is losing ground. Ground is both reason (or cause) 
and subjectivity. The victim becomes the happening, with no mediation or 
distance. There is no more “object” or intentionality to the experience, no 
relation or distance between self and other, inside and outside, no more 
energy or desire but only condensed pain. The limits of the body are broken, 
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as it is turned against itself, and destroyed as an organic, self-moving and 
self-preserving unit.  
“Whoever is overcome by pain through torture,” Améry writes, 
“experiences his body as never before. In self-negation [Selbstnegation], his 
flesh becomes total reality.”40 “Self-negation” is not a negation of the self (by 
itself) but a paradoxically experienced loss of self, along with the categorical 
distinction between self and other and self and reality. Both Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein made the claim that the essence of death is the impossibility 
(limit) of experience. Améry claims, however, that torture “blots out the 
contradiction of death and allows us to experience it personally.”41  
The text itself falls here into a void, and meaninglessness. The most it 
can do is mark a limit to what can be said or shown. Yet it nonetheless 
endeavors to pull us, readers, nearer to the edge of this void, and thus 
farther from ourselves and our present state as readers and thinkers. 
Suggestively, Améry notes that, while “no road that can be traveled by logic 
leads us to death… perhaps the thought is permissible that through pain a 
path of feeling and premonition can be paved to it for us.”42 The telos of this 
path of feeling, I believe, is not torture or death per se, any more than it is 
sadism or the Third Reich. The aim is rather to develop and cultivate our 
capacity to approximate the limits of ourselves and of the world, and to 
empathetically navigate toward the experience of victims. The capacity to do 
so does not fall under the jurisdictions of the Understanding, Reason, or the 
Imagination, and it is important–critical, in the precise sense of the word–
that we disallow them from taking over the operation of thought.  
Whereas what Kant calls the “empirical character” is in some sense 
always an other (even when it is mine), since its existence presupposes a 
removed spectator, and what he calls the “intelligible character” is always 
essentially a self, a cogito (even when it is another’s), the “victim-existence” 
is never properly self or other, since victimhood destroys the distance and 
relation between self and other. We should therefore realize that 
approximating the void of the victim-existence is never simply a matter of 
approximating the experience of another person (that which is “beyond” the 
limit, so to speak), but of approximating the limits of Geist as such.  
Thus located at the limits of Geist, of time and space, victimhood 
requires a quasi-transcendental status, on a par with the agent and the 
spectator, yet different from both. Setting this third mode of being as a 
horizon and standard marks out a different, pathological, path of thinking-
feeling that is neither practical nor theoretical. This path lacks the self-
grounding and certainty of the other two and denies, rather than grants, the 
self-governance they claim. Yet by turning away from it, or denying it, 
reason remains partially blind to its own nature and to its essential 
limitations. It therefore fails to live up the “courage to know” exhalted by 
Kant.   
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d) Impractical morality 
Under the auspices of pure practical reason, if we deny free agency to the 
Nazis, we effectively absolve them of their accountability and deprive the 
event of all moral significance. The experience of victims, conversely, is, for 
practical reason, derivative at best.  
 Pathological thinking as I present it here is impractical, which is not 
the same as “non-practical.” It inverts the point of view of practical reasoning 
and its order of priorities. For it, as we saw in the case of Améry, what 
endows an event with significance is the presence of a victim and suffering. 
By contrast, the question of whether there is or is not free agency behind the 
victim experience is derivative at best.  
Whereas practical reasoning, following “a rule of its own” as Kant 
puts it, always postulates the existence of free agents and intelligible causes, 
and theoretical reasoning always produces causal explications, pathology 
always seeks out the victim. And, just like there is no real conflict between 
practical and theoretical thinking, so too there should be no real conflict 
between either of them and pathological thinking. Given a transcendental 
perspective, these standpoints are reconciled as antinomic rules for 
reflection. But the point on which a dispute between practical and 
pathological thinking is perhaps inevitable is the meaning of morality: to 
which of the two does the adjective “moral” properly  belong? 
There is a whole category of acts that are of supreme import from the 
point of view of practical reason but fall completely out of the spectrum of 
pathology, and vice versa. A certain case of theft or dishonesty, for example, 
may be of moral significance to practical reason but not to pathological 
thinking. The experience of terminal illness, in which there is no hostile 
agent (other than nature itself perhaps) but only a suffering patient, may not 
in itself be a moral issue, or any issue at all, for practical philosophy, but for 
pathology it is morally charged. In fact, the moral significance of one and the 
same act or experience would be located in completely different places by each 
of these standpoints.  
This dispute is far more difficult to resolve for it is a matter of moral 
sensibility. As we saw in Kant, the very notion of “moral sensibility” may be 
oxymoronic since pure practical reasoning establishes the moral domain as 
categorically unaffected. Being unmoved is its greatest source of pride and 
what it most respects about humanity as such. This Stoic ideal of moral 
apathy, however, suggests a troublesome affinity, or at least lack of 
sufficiently strong opposition, between this kind of thinking and “the rule of 
the antiman.”  
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Conclusion 
If my reconstruction is valid, then Améry’s argument is just as much aimed 
at intellectuals as it is at the perpetrators of this particular historical event. 
One thing in common to Nazism and agency-centered philosophies like 
Kant’s is their hubris. The Nazis hated humanity because it involves 
passivity. Kant loved humanity because he thought that, at its best or 
emblematic condition, it doesn’t. Both were averse to the same thing.  
The Nazis longed to purify themselves not only of Jews, but of the 
Roma, the Poles, the old, the mentally and the fatally ill… in short, of all 
things they considered pathetic, abject, unbeautiful, and unhealthy. To 
counter Nazism, not only as a historical occurrence, but as an essence, is to 
muster the courage to face the pathetic and even inhuman aspects of the 
human condition itself. Améry’s refusal to “bear” his torture with 
equanimity, in the way Himmler expected his torturers to bear it, and his 
refusal to survive it as a human being or to fully regain his agency and social 
dignity in its aftermath, is at least in part a matter of defending passivity as 
such, in all its indignity.  
To philosophically apply the courage to be passive, or to linger with 
passivity, is to reach towards limits where the mind is humbled and 
impoverished. Cultivating this movement of thought toward the limits of 
reason became Améry’s intellectual mission. In one of his last books, on 
suicide, he claimed that, “under certain impossible conditions it is necessary 
to think ‘toward’ things that are… unthinkable.”43 “We are already,” he 
wrote there, “on our way, not away from persons annihilating themselves, 
but toward them.”44 The “unthinkable” can be the condition of a suicidally 
depressed person, a torture victim, a Jew in Nazi Germany, or any condition 
that is fundamentally different from that of the thinker, and difficult to relate 
to and communicate with. Améry contrasted this “thinking-toward the 
unthinkable” to “the pumped up common sense that cannot see beyond its 
own interests.”45  
The voices of victims, and other outcasts, become important not only 
because of what they had undergone, but because, or insofar, as their 
testimonies resist appropriation and communication, as if they spoke to us 
from across an insurmountable limit, or the other side of a fence. The move 
from grounding morality in autonomous agency to grounding it in such 
liminal experiences of dispossession (neither self nor other) implies a 
paradigm shift from a will to power and self-governance to 
acknowledgment of the violability and inherent relationality of the human 
condition. Ironically, although at the point of limit we are most estranged 
from others, and from ourselves, it is also at this point that we are most 
exposed to, and are irreducibly with, one another.  
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Finally, since victimhood, however transcendental in stature, is 
something that happens, focusing on it necessarily grounds reflection in 
concrete events. This distinguishes the pathological mode of thinking from 
the kind grounded in a priori universal laws. Nevertheless, as we saw, the 
“concrete event,” insofar as it becomes the ground and horizon for 
phenomenological reflection, is not reducible to an empirical or 
historiographic fact. What links these elements: the concrete event, the 
victim-existence, and the mind’s limits, is passion, as a point of reference that 
categorically differs from both appearances (the empirical) and wills (the 
intelligible).  
When seen in this way, passion is no longer regarded as obtrusive to the 
process of maturation, let alone as what this process needs to overcome, but 
as a necessary aspect of it. After all, I suspect many would agree with me that 
overestimating the extent of one’s independence, intelligence, and powers is 
more a mark of adolescence than of maturity. Perhaps they may also 
concede that it sometimes takes a blow–a traumatizing and humbling 
encounter with reality–to help one grow out of this adolescent hubris and 
profoundly rethink one’s identity, relation to others, and place in the world.   
I will conclude the paper with a passage from Améry’s preface, in 
which he proposes his own answer to the question, “what is 
enlightenment?’: 
[E]nlightenment… as I understand it… embraces [beyond logical 
deduction and empirical verification] the will and the ability to 
speculate phenomenologically, to empathize, to approach the limits 
of reason. Only when we fulfill the law of the enlightenment and at 
the same time transcend it do we reach intellectual realms in which 
ratio does not lead to shallow rationalism. This is why I always 
proceed from the concrete event, but never become lost in it; rather 
I always take it as an occasion for reflections that extend beyond 
reasoning and the pleasure in logical argument to areas of thought 
that lie in an uncertain twilight and will remain therein, no matter 
how much I strive to attain the clarity necessary in order to lend 
them contour. However–and in this I must persist–enlightenment is 
not the same as clarification [Aufklärung is nicht gleich Abklärung]. I 
had no clarity when I was writing this little book, I do not have it 
today, and I hope that I never will…  
Emotions? For all I care, yes. Where is it decreed that 
enlightenment must be free of emotion? To me the opposite seems 
to be true. Enlightenment can properly fulfill its task only if its sets 
to work with passion.46  
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